Reducing the Software Risk in Ground Systems by Bailey, Brandon
Reducing the Software Risk in 
Ground Systems
February 26, 2018
Brandon Bailey
brandon.t.bailey@nasa.gov
304-629-8992
Ground System Architectures Workshop 
Tutorial I
NASA’s IV&V Program
Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Office
Information Assurance/Cybersecurity Support
http://www.nasa.gov/centers/ivv 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20180001541 2019-08-30T13:09:59+00:00Z
Agenda/Outline
• Tutorial I Outline:
– Getting on the Same Page with Ground Systems
– Threat Landscape
– What is SW in a Ground System?
– SW Security is Required but Barriers Exist
– What about NIST?
– Approach for Secure and Resilient Software
• System Threat Modeling
• Sample Process for Developing Secure Software
• Software Threat Modeling
• Alphabet Soup - VA, SCA, OA, CWE, CVE, CWSS
– Ground Software Example: FEPs  
– Near Team Goals and What to do Now?
– Trends and Lessons Learned
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Defining “Ground Systems” @ NASA
3
Spacecraft Ground Systems encompasses the
entire system, beginning with issuing the
command from the MOC up until it emits from the
antenna to the reception of radio signals down at
the antenna to displaying telemetry on the MOC
computer
TLM 
Archive
Defining “Ground Systems”
…in the Military World
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http://www.cyberdefensereview.org/2015/12/10/mission-command-primer/
Are the Threats Real?
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It’s making the news….
Are the Threats Real?
6
Research Paper
David Livingstone and Patricia Lewis
International Security Department | September 2016
Space, the Final Frontier for Cybersecurity?
“Attacks on the ground infrastructure, such as satellite control 
centres, the associated networks and data centres, leading to 
potential global impacts (for example on weather forecasting 
systems, which use large quantities of space-derived data).”
As a result, the technology installed in them and in some ground 
systems can become obsolete, creating serious legacy problems. 
The pace at which technology evolves makes it hard, or even 
impossible, to devise a timely response to space cyberthreats. 
The vulnerabilities of satellites to cyberattack include attacks 
that are aimed at ground stations.
Most satellites launched in recent years rely on computers 
that are installed in the satellite themselves and that require 
regular upgrades through remote access. 
Two US government satellites fell victim to cyber-attacks in 2007 
and 2008, claims report highlighting control systems' vulnerability. 
The report, warns: "Access to a satellite's controls could allow an 
attacker to damage or destroy the satellite. " The Landsat 7 
satellite saw 12 minutes of "interference" in October 2007; the 
Terra then suffered two minutes in June 2008. In July 2008 the 
Landsat 7 had another 12 minutes' interference. Finally in October 
2008 the Terra was affected for nine minutes.   
[ref: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/oct/27/chinese-hacking-us-satellites-suspected]/
Evolving Threatscape for Space Missions
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THREATS ARE BOTH
BECOMING MORE FREQUENT
AND MORE MALICIOUS
PAST: 
• KNOWN VULNERABILITIES AND
ATTACK VECTORS
• OUT OF BOX SECURITY
CURRENT:
• EMERGING THREATS
• PHISHING
• INSIDER THREAT
• ADVANCED PERSISTENT
THREATS (APT)
• ZERO-DAY THREATS
CURRENT/FUTURE:
• UNKNOWN VULNERABILITY
AND/OR THREAT
• VULNERABILITY AT CREATION
• SUPPLY CHAIN
• OTHERS…
SATELLITE SYSTEM
VULNERABILITIES TO THREATS
• Custom software located throughout the 
system present potential vulnerabilities 
to software threats
- Spacecraft
- Mission Operations Center (MOC)
- Mission planning area
- Software development environment
• Software interfaces throughout the 
system, present potential vulnerabilities –
both insider and external threats
• Software resiliency to vulnerabilities and 
weaknesses
- Security architecture
- Software controls against credible 
threats
- Common Weakness Enumerations 
(CWEs)
- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
(CVEs)
Adversary Tiers
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Tier Name Skills Maliciousness Motivation Methods
I
Script Kiddies Very low Low Boredom, thrill 
seeking
Download and run already-
written hacking scripts known 
as “toolkits”
II
Hackers for Hire Low Moderate Prestige, 
personal gain, 
thrill seeking
Write own scripts, engage in 
malicious acts, brag about 
exploits
III
Small Hacker Teams, 
Non-State Actors OR 
Disorganized/Non-
Advanced State 
Actors
Moderate Moderate Power, 
prestige, 
intellectual 
gain, respect
Write scripts and automated 
tools
IV
Large, Well-
Organized Teams, 
Criminal, Non-State, 
or State Actors
High High Personal gain, 
greed, revenge
Sophisticated attacks by 
criminal/thieves, may be 
“guns for hire” or involved in 
organized crime
V Highly-Capable State Actors
Very high Very high Ideology, 
politics, 
espionage
State sponsored, well-funded 
cyber-attacks against enemy 
nations
VI
Most Capable State 
Actors
Space Systems ARE Vulnerable!
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Space communication ALSO 
depends on “traditional” IT assets 
= 
Vulnerable to common  software  
based attacks
Tier V-VI
Tier I-VI
Tier III-VI
Tier III-VI
Back to the Basics
A. Custom developed?
B. Commercial-off-the-Shelf 
(COTS) Software?
C. Government-off-the-Shelf 
(GOTS) Software?
D. Free and Open Source 
Software (FOSS) ?
E. Industrial Control System 
(ICS) Software
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• In Ground Systems….What is Software?
• In Ground Systems….Where is Software Used?
Answer: All of the Above
Scope for this Discussion…
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TLM
CMD
Command and Control (C2)
Modem
CMD
TLM
CMD
TLM
FEP
CMD
TLM
CM
D
TL
M
ECHO
Interacts with ground 
software (combo of 
COTS/GOTS/FOSS)
Operating System 
(Windows, Linux, etc.)
FEPs (RT Logic, 
Amergint, Avtec etc.)
Software Security
• Why
– SW controls mission critical activities such as 
command sequencing, scheduling, satellite tracking, 
launch control and payload operations
• What
– With any system or system of systems, the software 
is a critical component and the security of said 
software is equally important 
• How
– Designing in security (e.g. threat modeling) and using 
secure coding practices (e.g. coding standards and 
tools)
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But Where are the Requirements?
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• OMB-130 -- “Security of Federal Automated Information Systems”
• Executive Order 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical 
Infrastructure,
• Federal agency directives (DoD 8510.01, NASA NPR 2810, etc.)
• DoDI 5000.02 and DoDI 5200.39
• …
FISMA requires each agency to use a risk-based approach to develop, document, 
and implement an agency wide security program for the information and 
information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency, including 
those provided or managed by another agency, contractor, or other source. 
Flowing Down…
• How do these directives, EOs, policies, etc. 
prevent software weaknesses and vulnerabilities 
(e.g. buffer overflows and unsanitized input)?
– SW developers do not develop to these requirements 
which is a barrier
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Other Barriers to Reducing SW Risk
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Barrier Detail
Security as a Technical 
(Systems Engineering) 
function
Programs/Systems may choose to comply with baseline controls 
in the NIST 800 series compared to performing the mission 
security analysis using risks and threats
Evolving Threatscape The evolving threatscape entails full understanding of current 
and future threats that can exploit system vulnerabilities
Security is more than IT The perception that Information Technology (IT) protects (e.g. 
border firewalls) a mission environment is no longer adequate 
in the evolving threatscape
Complex Supply Chains System complexity leads to large supply chains, including 
delivery of various products using varying processes
Belief “This will not 
happen to me”
Given the history of success of NASA/DoD missions, a cavalier 
attitude is possible. This is not secure, given the evolving 
threatscape. Hope is not the security strategy, any more than it 
is for Safety.
Other Barriers to Reducing SW Risk
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Barrier Detail
Culture of Openness Security control of information is counter to some cultures of 
openness and sharing with International Partners and the Public 
(e.g. NASA).
Traditional Systems 
Engineering approach 
led to stovepipe 
elements
The top-down elaboration and allocation process has 
successfully led to complex systems being developed, including 
infrastructure and legacy systems. The advent of security has a 
unique architecture view to traditional systems engineering 
approaches
Security as a Priority The priority of security must be emphasized at an Agency, 
Program, Center/Installation, and Project level.
Governance and 
Organizations
To achieve an appropriate security posture, organizations such 
as the Protection Programs, Chief Information Officers, System 
Engineers, Operators, Institutional Systems, Programs, and SMA 
need to work together.
Terminology An outcome of the multiple organizations is that each may have 
slightly unique vernacular. Arriving at a common terminology 
enables a shared strategy, implementation and operation.
NIST Can Help….
• If implemented and governed properly NIST can help but 
usually NIST is thought to be “compliance” only
• The security control structure is made up of the following 
sections:
– Control section
– Supplemental guidance section
– Control enhancements section
– References section
– Priority and baseline allocation section
• Remember! NIST provides guidance not requirements
• NIST intentionally presents controls written at a very high 
level of abstraction
– System Specification Requirements: 
• Developed by translating the abstract controls into specific requirements
– These would be further decomposed from the system level
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Example:  SI-10 (NIST 800-53 Rev 4)
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NIST Security Controls that 
Apply to Software
• Compiled an initial selection of NIST 800-53r4 controls that relate to software or 
software control
• 113 of 343 “High” Baseline controls and enhancements implemented by software
• Note: Additional controls or enhancements may be brought into focus while 
following the evidence in support of an analysis finding
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ID FAMILY Relates to 
software
Total
AC Access Control 24 43
AU Audit and Accountability 19 28
CM Configuration Management 8 31
IA Identification and Authentication 20 24
MP Media Protection 1 12
RA Risk Assessment 3 8
SC System and Communications Protection 22 30
SI System and Information Integrity 16 27
NIST Too High Level?
• NIST can be too high level and abstract for SW 
developers
• Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) prevention is a 
more implementable “requirement”
• For the same SI-10 NIST Control the following CWEs 
apply
– 77, 134, 22, 23, 20, 73, 79, 78, 119, 787, 805, 131, 170
• Whatever your method, requirements need to be clear 
and understood
– Requirement to have “secure code” is not good enough
– Requirement to implement and be compliant with NIST is 
not good enough without thorough technical governance
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An Approach for Secure & Resilient SW
• Not “the” approach but “an” approach to help 
solve this problem
– We do agree a problem exists, right?
• Need secure designs and secure code
– Is their a difference?
– CWE prevention != Secure Design & vice versa
• “An” approach to secure design = Threat 
Modeling (system and code level)
• “An” approach to secure code = CWE prevention 
(oh….and don’t forget CVE prevention either)
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System Level Threat Modeling
22
Generalized Process to Develop 
Secure Software
• Systems Engineering Process to design out security risk
• Establish credible threats and vulnerabilities, and designs in software controls, following NIST guidelines
• Once security implementation approach is established (System Security Plan), development proceeds 
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Part 2: Develop Security Strategy
- Develop security architecture and ConOps
- Capture in Project Protection Plan
- Preliminary @ SDR; Baseline @ PDR
Part 3: Select and Tailor Security 
Controls 
- Many controls software based
- Preliminary @ SDR, Baseline @ PDR
Part 1: Assess Mission for Credible Threats, and Vulnerabilities
-Credible threats based on situational environment
-Vulnerabilities assessed by establishing security risk to system
- Preliminary @ KDP 0 (~SRR); Baseline @ KDP 1 (~SDR)
Part 4: Implement and Test Security Strategy and Controls
Products: Verified and Validated Secure Software
• Defined controls become basis for system and software requirements
• Implement in accordance with traditional lifecycle development
• System level tests consider threat scenarios
Part 3: The Security Plan 
is a Pivotal artifact that 
captures security 
strategy, presents 
controls and sets the 
basis for implementation
Lifecycle development occurs based on 
the SSP and secure coding practices
• Development of the Project Protection Plans (PPP)
require an understanding of credible threats
• Developing credible threats for identified mission
– General information in CCSDS green book 
– Leverage all intel sources at all levels
– Threat Summary can be classified Top Secret
• The key project inputs for the threat summary 
process are:
– Mission overview
– Lifecycle phase
• Evolving Threat Summary process – work with all
stakeholders and other agencies to identify credible 
threats in order to develop the PPP. 
Threat Summary: 
Documents the threat 
environment that a 
space 
system/constellation 
or aircraft is most likely 
to encounter as it 
reaches operational 
capability
Part 1: System Security Threat 
Understanding
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– CONOPS
– Communication links
The key elements of the Project Protection Plan (PPP):
• Vulnerabilities Analysis
– What will prevent the system from reaching mission
requirements due to threats causing vulnerabilities?
• Risk Analysis
– Sufficient detail must be documented in the risk analysis for senior decision makers to 
approve the project at key decision points (KDPs). The risk analysis must answer all 
the vulnerabilities driven by the threat and potential countermeasures and mitigations.
– Also in the risk analysis, document what risks will not be addressed and the rationale 
behind that decision.
– Consider Defense in Depth, 
Evolving Threatscape
• Likely a classified document
and should have information
Part 2: Develop Security Strategy
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• Mission Overview
• Mission Support Elements
• e.g., Comm networks, ground systems, 
navigations  and tracking systems, enterprise 
security
• Threat Overview
• System Criticality and Susceptibilities
• Architecture – critical elements and nodes
• CONOPS – critical processes
• Mission Vulnerabilities and Risks
• Protection Strategies
• Countermeasures
PPP
Part 3: The System Security Plan
• In order to select controls, begin by specifying and  
documenting the information system’s…
– Categorization per FIPS-199
– Information types
– Security impact
levels for
• Confidentiality
• Integrity
• Availability
– Security boundary and 
interfaces
• Each information system has its own SSP (multiple per mission) per the strategy 
provided in the Project Protection Plan. Risk assessment captured in companion 
document, Risk Assessment Report (RAR).
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INFORMATION TYPE
(Derived from NIST SP 800-60)
D11 – Transportation
INFORMATION SUB-TYPE D11.4 – Space Operations
Confidentiality Impact Level NIST: Low OWNER: Moderate
Integrity Impact Level NIST: High OWNER: High
Availability Impact Level NIST: High OWNER: High
Justification for any deviation from 
the NIST recommended impact level
Business functions involve 
proprietary information
• NIST = National Institute of Standards and Technology
• FIPS = Federal Information Processing Standard
• FIPS Publications are standards issued by NIST after approval
Select all the security controls
based on the security
categorization process
Tailor by applying scoping, 
parameterization, 
and compensating control 
guidance
Supplement with 
Agency supplemental security 
controls for selected controls
Document in the SSP
Security Controls, in 
SSP
Specify the minimum control requirements
Identify from this set which of the security controls are common 
controls or controlled by another organization
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Baseline of 
Security Controls
Tailored and 
Scoped Security 
Controls
Supplemented 
Security Controls
Part 3: Select and Tailor Security Controls
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To select security controls, engineers must:
• Risk based process
• Engineering Analysis
• Iterative in nature 
• Continuous monitoring
System Security Plan
• Information types
• Security impact levels 
for Confidentiality, 
Integrity, Availability
• Security boundary and 
interfaces
• Security controls
Part 3: Security Controls Families (NIST 800-53)
Within a Control Family, analyze controls based on 
1) Required controls, based on FIPS-199 classification
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ID FAMILY
AC Access Control
AT Awareness and Training
AU Audit and Accountability
CA Security Assessment and 
Authorization
CM Configuration Management
CP Contingency Planning
IA Identification and
Authentication
IR Incident Response
MA Maintenance
MP Media Protection
PE Physical and
Environmental Protection
PL Planning
PS Personnel Security
RA Risk Assessment
SA System and Services Acquisition
SC System and Communications Protection
SI System and Information Integrity
PM Program Management = relates to software or software control
2) Evaluation of supplemental controls, enhancements 
that are not explicitly specified 
Example SI-10 (3)
SI-10  Information Input Validation. 
Enhancement (3) Information input validation | Predictable 
behavior  The information system behaves in a predictable and 
documented manner that reflects organizational and system objectives 
when invalid inputs are received. 
Supplemental Guidance: …This control enhancement ensures that 
there is predictable behavior in the face of invalid inputs by specifying 
information system responses that facilitate transitioning the system to 
known states without adverse, unintended side effects.
Complexity of satellite 
development supply chains 
pose vulnerabilities 
Part 4: Secure Software 
Development 
Example Supply Chain Risks
• Undefined security requirements, 
policies, and practices limiting 
overarching security 
considerations
• Insecure software delivery 
mechanisms, leading to theft or 
malware injection
• Code and design defects that lead 
to vulnerable software 
• Integration of insecure 3rd party 
libraries. 
Software Threats Description (CCSDS Green Book, Section 3.4.9) Mitigations/Controls
Users, system operators, and programmers often make mistakes that 
can result in security problems. Users or administrators can install 
unauthorized or un-vetted software, which might contain bugs, 
viruses, spyware, or which might simply result in system instability. 
System operators might configure a system incorrectly resulting in 
security weaknesses. Programmers may introduce logic or 
implementation errors which could result in system vulnerabilities 
or instability. 
• Unauthorized/Un-Vetted SW: Provide 
appropriate focus on Supply Chain risks
• Logic/Implementation Errors: Utilize 
Coding Standards and integrate tools 
into development environment (e.g. VA,
OA, SCA, Threat Modeling)
• Plan for Defense in Depth and secure the 
development environment
 
Program 
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Supplier 
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Develop 
In-house 
Supplier 
Reuse 
Outsourc
Supplier 
Open-Source 
Software 
Contractor 
COTS 
Acquire 
Develop 
In-house 
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Outsource 
Offshore 
US Foreign  
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Foreign 
Location 
Foreign 
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? 
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Prime 
Contractor 
Legacy 
Software 
Other 
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Software Threat Modeling
• Microsoft Threat Modeling Process
– Who
• The adversary does a good job so maybe we should try it
– What
• Repeatable process to find & address all threats to SW
– When
• Earlier the better, gives more time to fix
– Why
• Find problems earlier and ensures more secure SW
– How
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https://download.microsoft.com/download/9/3/5/935520EC-D9E2-413E-BEA7-0B865A79B18C/Introduction_to_Threat_Modeling.ppsx
Some Key Features
• Identify threats to the SW as a whole 
to include the security features and 
attack surfaces
• Enables improving SW design by to 
effectively find security problems 
early in the process
• STRIDE
31
Standard Mitigations
32
Resources
33
Secure Software Development 
Tools: VA vs SCA vs OA
• Vulnerability Assessment (VA) 
– Running of tool(s) to identify known vulnerabilities and/or configuration 
settings that could lead to an impact to confidentiality, integrity or availability. 
VA identifies Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) or non-compliance 
with compliance regulations (e.g. STIGs)
• Static Code Analysis (SCA)
– Running of tools that attempt to highlight possible weaknesses within 'static' 
(non-running) source code by using techniques such as taint analysis and data 
flow analysis. SCA identifies Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs).
• Origin Analysis (OA) 
– OA fingerprints the binaries and folder structures, which discovers the third-
party components used by the developer of the software, and creates a “bill 
of materials”.  Based on each identified component and its version, the tool 
then crosschecks its database for known vulnerabilities and software licenses 
associated with the component and categorize each as potential security or 
operational risks respectively. OA identifies Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures (CVEs) and risks with open source license usage. 34
We “should” be doing this already!
• The requirements for security testing software are 
present in existing guidance (e.g. NIST Control RA-5) 
– Knowledge, tool availability, oversight and governance could be 
improved which puts government at risk
– Credentialed vulnerability scanning, static code analysis, origin 
analysis and dynamic analysis of software is needed to 
adequately reduce software risk
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Assess SW against Common Vulnerabilities and exposure 
(CVE):
• Identifies publicly known information security vulnerabilities and 
assign them a CVE_ID. 
• Scored 1 to 10 on CVSS scale
• Operating Systems, Applications, FOSS, etc. 36
Common Weakness Enumerations (CWE):
Serves as a common language for describing software security weaknesses in architecture, design, or code. 
Protection is important for Ground SW, less vulnerabilities/threats for Flight SW.  Originated by MITRE.
• Standard measuring stick for software security tools targeting these weaknesses
• Common baseline standard for weakness identification, mitigation, and prevention efforts
• Utilize CWE to better understand, identify, fix, and prevent weaknesses and vulnerabilities
Assess CWEs against common attack pattern enumeration 
and classification (CAPEC):
• Community-developed list of common attack patterns
• Comprehensive schema and classification taxonomy
• International in scope
Common Weakness Scoring System (CWSS) of CWEs
• High impact within our system
• Values will be different for flight and ground (system dependent)
Top/Most 
Dangerous CWEs
CWEs may already be addressed 
through good coding practices 
including use of static code 
analyzers with appropriate 
checkers (e.g. buffer overflow), 
coding standards, code 
walkthroughs, etc.
with
Secure and Resilient Code
Let’s Break that Down…
• In order to provide assurance from a secure 
code perspective we need to establish:
– The weaknesses in the software we deem most 
important within the context of the system
• These could in turn be “requirements”
– A link between the tools used for analysis and the 
most important weaknesses
– Create a plan to maximize coverage with respect 
to static code analysis coverage
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CWE Rack and Stack
• Source of weaknesses
– Common Weakness Enumeration 
• Ex: CWE 20: Improper Input Validation
• Weakness parents / children
• Impacts to CIA
• Examples
• Which ones do we care most about?
– High impact within our system
– Broad attack surface (many patterns, low technical barrier)
– Evidence of real world exploitation
• Will have to use a combination of objective and 
subjective inputs
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• CWSS can help determine the CWEs with high impact within our 
system
• https://cwe.mitre.org/cwss/cwss_v1.0.1.html
• Values will be different for each system (e.g. spacecraft and ground)
– Realistically this should be performed on a per mission / system basis
CWSS evaluation
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Each factor in the category is 
assigned a value. These values 
are converted to associated 
weights and a category sub-
score is calculated. The three 
sub-scores are multiplied 
together, which produces a 
Common Weakness Scoring 
System (CWSS) score. Higher the 
score, higher it ranks.
Let’s Add in CAPEC
• Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and 
Classification
– https://capec.mitre.org
• Community-developed list of common attack 
patterns
• Comprehensive schema and classification 
taxonomy
• International in scope
• Taking into account attack pattern and any other 
factors to generate list of CWEs that are critical.
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Combining it All
• Calculates Scoring based on CWSS
– CWSS = BaseFindingScore * AttackSurfaceScore 
* EnvironmentScore
– Subjective due to system dependability
• Maintain ranking of CAPEC scores
– Will have to use your own ranking system
– More objectivity
• Maintain relationship between tools used and CWEs
– Easily demonstrate which CWEs are covered
– Can be used to develop future tools (Config generators, etc.)
• Process = Near complete picture of the top CWEs
• Subjective and Objective measures
– Subjective - CWSS
– Objective - CVE 
– Hybrid - CAPEC
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Disclaimer
= Using mapping from tool vendors on their 
CWE coverage. Verification and Validation has 
not been perform!
Research being performed at SAMATE & CMU-
SEI to help with this problem. 
Rapid Expansion of Classification Models to Prioritize Static 
Analysis Alerts for C 
https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/Presentation/2017_017_001_506534.pdf
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• Peer reviewed most dangerous list of CWEs for system
– Perfect ? No
– Good enough ? Yes
– Better than blindly accepting tool vendor criticality? Yes
• A link between the tools available and the most 
important weaknesses
– Associate tool checks with CWEs
– Mapped to secure coding standards/guidelines
Results
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Know what you are trying to prevent before 
selecting coding standards and tools
• CWE 311: Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
– Btw also NIST SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality 
and Integrity 
• Adhere CERT Rules 
– MSC00-J
– MSC18-C
– WIN04-C
• Fortify has checkers for this which can reduce 
likelihood of being in code
Simple Use Case #1
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Simple Use Case #2
• CWE 119: Improper Restriction of Operations within 
the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
– Btw also NIST SI-10 Information Input Validation
• Adhere CERT Rules 
– ARR38-C, STR32-C, STR31-C, FIO37-C, EXP39-C, EXP33-C, 
ENV01-C, CTR50-CPP, ARR30-C, ARR00-C, ARR38-C, ARR00-
C, CTR52-CPP, ARR30-C, STR32-C, CTR50-CPP, CTR52-CPP, 
EXP33-C, STR31-C, EXP39-C, FIO37-C, ENV01-C 
• Fortify does not have a checker mapped to this
– But Klockwork does
• ABV.ANY_SIZE_ARRAY, ABV.GENERAL, ABV.ITERATOR, ABV.STACK, 
ABV.TAINTED, NNTS.MIGHT, NNTS.MUST, 
SV.STRBO.BOUND_SPRINTF, SV.STRBO.UNBOUND_COPY, 
SV.STRBO.UNBOUND_SPRINTF, SV.TAINTED.LOOP_BOUND 
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Takeaway
• One SCA tool is not going to ensure code is secure
• For real security assurance, must know what you 
want to prevent
– What risk am I reducing in my system/software
• Now pick the rules/guidelines and tools to help 
reduce that risk
• Great resource for identifying tools 
– Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) Report | Spreadsheet
– NASA also maintains matrix for mapping Top CWEs to tools to 
CERT rules
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• 5.5 million lines of ground SW analyzed
• Klocwork and Fortify executed
• Surprised?
– Not surprising given that the tools only have a 22% overlap in the 
ability to detect the same defects from NASA’s most dangerous 
CWE list
Real World Example
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Overlap of defects was 15%
• Of the 49 most dangerous CWEs in ground 
systems
– Klocwork against C/C++ = 47% coverage 
– Adding HP Fortify increases coverage by almost 35%
– Giving the ability to detect 82% of the CWEs in 
C/C++
• Similarly, if HP Fortify is the only tool used then 
the tool only has the ability to detect 57% in 
C/C++, but by adding Klocwork an increase of 
25% is realized, resulting in 82% coverage
Real World Example (cont.)
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Targeted Metrics
• NASA’s Most Dangerous Common Weakness Enumerations 
(CWEs) were used as a basis for evaluation as an additional 
overlay to what the tools report as Critical/High/Medium
– NASA’s most dangerous CWEs is a list published by NASA’s Secure 
Coding Portal (SCP) team, which classifies the most dangerous 
weaknesses for ground software (similar to SANS Top 25 software 
errors)
– Subset of weakness that mapped to the most dangerous ground 
system CWEs
49
Takeaway
• If a program’s security approach was simply to 
execute one SCA tool, that would be a good 
start but not good enough
• Could result in a false sense of security
• In the previous example, if one tool was use 
there’s a risk that ~ 50% of the dangerous 
CWEs would be in the SW
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But Wait There’s More
• Don’t forget….
– Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
• Two flavors to worry about
– COTS CVEs (Windows, Linux, Intel, etc.)
• Installed on end points
– FOSS CVEs (Struts, Xerces, Apache, etc.)
• Embedded within custom code or installed on end 
points
• Different tools for detection
– Vulnerability Assessment vs Origin Analysis
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Origin Analysis:
Secure SW Supply Chain
• From Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)  SOAR Report – “Origin analyzers 
are tools that analyze source code, bytecode, or binary code to determine 
their origins (e.g., pedigree and version).”
• Origin Analysis can be used to reduce the software supply chain risk
– Identifies CVEs that may be present in re-used open source libraries/code
– Also identifies potentially licensing issues
• Examples of tools
– Sonatype
• Binary scanner; Works best on JAVA
– Black Duck HUB 
• Provides binary and source tree scanning; Support C/C++ as well has JAVA
– OWASP Dependency Check
• Currently Java, .NET, Ruby, Node.js, and Python projects are supported; additionally, limited 
support for C/C++ projects is available for projects using CMake or autoconf.
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OA: Examples from Ground Systems
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Vulnerability Affected File Mitigation
CVE-2014-0003: Allows remote
attackers to execute arbitrary Java
methods via a crafted message.
camel-core-
1.5.4.0-fuse.jar
Upgrade Jar file to 2.11.4 or newer
CVE-2009-4611: Allow remote
attackers to modify a window's
title, or possibly execute arbitrary
commands or overwrite files, via an
HTTP request
jetty-6.1.14.jar;
jetty-util-
6.1.14.jar
Upgrade Jar file to 6.1.25 or newer
CVE-2011-2730: Allows remote
attackers to obtain sensitive
information
spring-web-
2.5.5.jar
Upgrade Jar file to 3.2.9 or newer
CVE-2014-0107: Allows remote
attackers to bypass expected
restrictions and load arbitrary
classes or access external resources
via a crafted messages
xsltc.jar;
xalan.jar
Upgrade Jar file to 2.7.2 or newer
CVE-2013-4002: Allows remote
attackers to affect availability via
unknown vectors.
Xerces2.6.2_xer
cesImpl.jar;
xercesImpl.jar
N/A (new versions exist but also
contain vulnerabilities).
Implement host based restrictions
(i.e., IP tables, file integrity
detection, Host based IDS)
CVE-2010-1244: Allows remote
attackers to hijack the
authentication of unspecified
victims
activemq-web-
5.2.0.2-fuse.jar
Upgrade Jar file to 5.9.0 or newer
Real World Example
• Analyzed ~5.5 million line of custom developed ground 
software using the OA tools
– Mostly C/C++ and Java
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» Identified 350 (7%) out of 
5,000 third party components 
contained a combined 2,000 
CVEs in addition to some 
risky open source licenses. 
Vulnerability Assessment/Scanning
• Vulnerability scanning uses tools like Nessus, Foundstone, 
AlienVault, OpenVAS, Retina, SCAP, CIS Benchmarks
– Don’t confuse VA tools for SCA or OA tools
– Identifies CVEs, misconfigurations, and compliance issues
– Must be credentialed!!!!
• Example
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Real Life Example 
Front End Processors
Unsecure Design Example
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Scope for this Example
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FEPs (RT Logic, 
Amergint, Avtec etc.)
FEP: Commanding & Telemetry
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• Commanding
– Command and Control (C2) Systems automate user processes: 
• Send command sequences
• Translate mnemonics to binary commands
• Set limits on commanding
• Store logs of commands sent and telemetry received
– C2 controls the FEP
– Modem converts digital signal to analog signal (modulation)
– Transmitter amplifies and transmits RF signal
• Telemetry
– Receiver collects and amplifies RF signal.  
– Modem converts analog signal to digital signal (demodulation)
– Command and Control (C2) Systems automate user processes: 
• Translate frames/sub frames of telemetry into calibrated data (decomm)
• Set limits on telemetry
• Store logs of commands sent and telemetry received
FEP Providers
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• RT Logic (1997, Colorado Springs, CO)
– T501 Front-End Processor  
• Amergint (2008, Colorado Springs, CO)
– SoftFEP
• Avtec (1990, Fairfax, VA)/Ingenicomm (2010, Chantilly, VA)
– Programmable Telemetry Processor
• GDP Space Systems
– Components  
• Acromamatics Telemetry Systems (1971, Santa Barbara, CA) /Delta 
Information Systems, Inc. (1976, Horsham, PA)
– Model 2900AP PCI Telemetry System
– Model 2900AP - Lightweight Rackmount PCI Telemetry System
– Model 3022P - "Lunchbox" PCI Telemetry Data Processing System
– Model 4000 - Compact "quick-look" Telemetry System
• Aventas Inc. (2002, Richardson, TX)
Command and Telemetry
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Command and Telemetry
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Command and Control (C2)
Modem
FEP
FEP: Threats & Mitigations
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• Threats
– The connectivity between a FEP and a modem varies between 
programs.  It potentially contains many media and signal conversions.  
– Isolating issues to a FEP or the related infrastructure can be difficult.  
– The FEP and the related infrastructure is complex and functionality 
becomes prioritized over change management.  
– Defense of a FEP is expected on the boundaries, so they tend to have 
minimal end-point protection.  
– Testing of FEPs centers on functionality and requirements verification, 
not resiliency or reliability. 
• Mitigations
– Basic hardening produces significant gains in security posture.  
– FEPs have a relatively regular operations, meaning anomalous behavior 
should be relatively easy to recognize.  
– FEPs and the related infrastructure have a lot of redundancy and 
sparing.  
Sample Attack #1 during PenTest
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Input Validation             & Lack of Authentication Vulnerabilities
The software performs actions in the server’s operating system
using calls build in the “Python” scripting language. Several scripts
exist in the URLs that execute tasks in the OS and return the output
to the application.
The calls performed by these scripts are passed to the OS without
the use of input validation or any authentication at the
application/OS level. The use of these scripts creates a semi-shell
environment where a user can execute many OS commands
through the web browser.
NIST SI-10
NIST IA-3
Sample Attack #2 during PenTest
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Unsecure Design            =  Lack of Authentication Vulnerabilities
FEP intended design…. “Just write the message to the socket, and
read the reply. In fact, if you are so inclined, you can telnet to port
xxxxx and enter the messages directly.”
Therefore, anyone with access to the network has the capability to
send commands to these ports and reconfigure the FEP
unauthenticated. If used as an attack vector, it affects the
availability and integrity of the FEP system.
NIST IA-3
• You can’t boil the ocean
– Threat modeling takes time
– Classifying CWEs takes time
• Free to use NASA’s list as a starter, NASA
can share their customizable Access DB
– Procuring VA, SCA, & OA tools takes time
• Discussion has been geared around how to 
reduce risk staring from inception of system
– What about existing systems? Let’s discuss….
Near Term Goals
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Near Team Goals (cont.)
• Promote Defense-in-Depth
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Services Provided, Received
• Software runs on a Host
• Hosts are interconnected via the Network
• Developers code the software builds, 
updates, and patches in a non-operational 
environment
• Operators use the Hosts to interact with 
the Network and Software appropriately
• Administrators manage the Hosts and 
Networks while installing/configuring 
Software
Additionally:
• Software handles Data
• Mission runs within an Enterprise
Developers
Administrators
Users
Operators
Defense in Depth (DiD)
• Secure software development is extremely important but DiD 
is key to protecting mission assets
• In space mission environments, DiD can be difficult
– Older architectures/technology
• Unsupported operating systems, older hardware, etc.
– Shared architectures/technology
• Mission X doesn’t own all layers of the defense
• Sometimes vulnerable software depends on something that is 
out of their control to protect it
– Do you trust the Network Engineers? Should you?
– Do you control the host level configuration?
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DiD (cont.)
• Work with Network Engineers to implement 
enclaves/network zoning and/or encryption
– Migrate to a “zero trust” architecture 
• Vulnerabilities injected by Mission X may affect 
Mission Y
• Understand and eliminate pivot points
– From networking perspective, software security perspective, host level 
security
• Increase attack depth or eliminate all together
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Utilize tools like RedSeal Networks, Skybox, etc. to 
understand network topology and threat exposures
Example SW Impacting Mission
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Exploits Vulnerability
Establishes persistent 
foothold on Mission 
Asset 
Mission 
AssetCompromised Asset
Often Times F/W Rules 
Allow Access
Directly to Assets on 
Mission Networks
Mission
Control
Launch Attacks 
(DoS, Brute Force, 
Extract Data, etc.)
This example will depict how vulnerability on non-critical (trusted) asset 
within a network can potentially impact critical mission assets
Can’t assume protection from Firewall. Need “Defense 
in Depth”. Can’t assume if knocking on door, that they 
are supposed to be there.
Sample Exposure
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Demonstrates that a pathway exists from the VPN Landing Zone, 
Internet, Or Untrusted to a vulnerable asset in non-zero trust network
Vulnerability 
(trusted asset)
VPN Landing Zone, 
Internet, Or 
“Untrusted”
Sample Exposure
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Demonstrates all outbound access paths (Pivoting) from the vulnerable asset
Vulnerability 
(trusted asset)
Sample Exposure
72Demonstrates potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited from this server
Vulnerable Asset
“Pivot Point”
Mission Control that 
“wasn’t” network 
accessible from VPN, 
Untrusted, Etc.
Attack Depth = 1
What To Do Now?
• In space mission environments (esp. mission with extended 
ops) you may not be able to patch code; therefore for 
vulnerable code that can’t be fixed the “host” owner can
– Harden the servers and hosts by disabling all ports, 
protocols and services that are not explicitly required for 
operations
– Install file integrity software (i.e., TripWire, Aide) to alert to 
changes made to the file system
– Install and finely tune a host-based IDS that will alert to 
any anomalous traffic
– Utilize IP tables/IPFilters to limit data flow to specific IP 
addresses, ports, protocols and services
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What To Do Now?
• To prevent future deployments of vulnerable code
– Participate in secure code training
• Educate developers, PMs, Authorizing Officials, Security Personnel (ISSO, ISO, etc.) 
on the importance of eliminating vulnerable code from architecture
– Pick the low hanging fruit (see backup slides)
– Utilize Best Practices and Secure Coding Standards
• Ex: Best Practices from NASA’s Secure Coding Portal 
• Ex: Coding Standards (Ex. CERT C, C++ or JAVA Stds.)
– Institute static source code and binary analysis to assist in identifying 
weaknesses - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tools_for_static_code_analysis
• Apply the tools within the development activity (i.e., as an add-on to the 
developer's Integrated Development Environment (IDE)) as well as in the 
Independent Test and Evaluation (IT&E) activities
• Classify most dangerous CWEs for Ground Systems
– Use NASA’s or create you own based on your mission and threats
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Current Trends in the Field
• Lack of Defense in Depth (DiD) – Layered Security
– Border protection (i.e. Firewalls) is depended on too much
• Network management and insight  is insufficient 
– Lack of ground-truth topology 
– Lack of monitoring, alerting and knowing what is required or “normal”
• Industrial Control Systems are Vulnerable
– Not designed or operated with cyber resiliency in mind
• Patching and Security Testing is not a Priority
– Mission trumps all and patching/testing is delayed or never done
– Lack of vulnerability scanning, code analysis, & dynamic analysis
• Vulnerable COTS, Open Source, and Custom Code on networks
• Limited Staffing Investment
– Lacking appropriate training on technology/tools and knowledge
– Staff is overtasked with non cyber activities
• Programs are waiting for Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation 
(CDM) Phases 1 – 3 deployment to provide “security”
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IA/Cyber Lessons Learned in Space Systems
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Area Challenge Faced Potential Solutions
Overall 
Approach
• Adding security to in-process developments
• Incorporating security into existing processes
• Newness of artifacts to Development process, 
variations in artifact quality
Work together to 
incorporate as part of 
engineering and risk 
process
SSP • Using FIPS categorization to baseline control set 
without supplementation for mission-specific threats
• Defining customizations based on as-is design vs. 
identifying control substitutions or other mitigating 
factors—identification / documentation of residual 
risk
• Definition of SSPs around development of the ground 
segment (e.g. workstations, servers) instead of 
system/mission
• Sometime there are no SSPs for the spacecraft system
Projects ensure that 
asset protection is 
part of the 
engineering process, 
with results captured 
in the SSP. Promote 
best practices and 
lessons learned across 
projects
Security
Allocation to 
Requirements
• Security is not a distinct domain
• Requirements defined prior to availability of SSP, PPP, 
or Threat Summary
Ensure a top-down 
approach to 
addressing security
Backup Slides
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References / Links
• Zero Trust
– http://csrc.nist.gov/cyberframework/rfi_comments/040813_forrester_research.pdf
– http://www.ndm.net/firewall/pdf/palo_alto/Forrester-No-More-Chewy-Centers.pdf
• NIST 800-53  
– http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
• Space Security
– http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/aerospcae-engineering/cyber-security/cyber-crime-cyber-
space-outer-space/
– http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/hacked-space-are-satellites-next-cybersecurity-
battleground-n658231
– http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160922-space-cybersecurity-s-final-frontier
– Security Threats: https://public.ccsds.org/Pubs/350x1g2.pdf
– https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-09-22-space-
final-frontier-cybersecurity-livingstone-lewis.pdf
• Misc.:
– DoD: http://www.cyberdefensereview.org/2015/12/10/mission-command-primer/
– NASA Networks: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d104.pdf
– CIS Top 20: https://www.sans.org/media/critical-security-controls/SANS_CSC_Poster.pdf
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Links
CCSDS
• major space agencies of the world - http://public.ccsds.org/participation/member_agencies.aspx
• multi-national forum - http://cwe.ccsds.org/
Policies and such
• Program Protection & System Security Engineering - http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/initiatives/init_pp-sse.html
• 2810 - http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/N_PR_2810_001A_/N_PR_2810_001A_.pdf
• 7150.2B - http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/N_PR_7150_002B_/N_PR_7150_002B_.pdf
• 7120.5E - https://foiaelibrary.gsfc.nasa.gov/_assets/doclibBidder/tech_docs/1. N_PR_7120_005E_.pdf
• 800-53 - http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
• SA-11 - https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/800-53/Rev4/control?controlName=SA-11
• RA-5 - https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/800-53/Rev4/control?controlName=RA-5
• Security Quality Requirements Engineering (SQUARE) - http://www.cert.org/cybersecurity-engineering/products-services/square.cfm?
• Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/sdl/
SCA/OA
• C - https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/c/SEI+CERT+C+Coding+Standard
• C++ - https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=637
• JAVA - https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/java/SEI+CERT+Oracle+Coding+Standard+for+Java
• Klockwork - http://www.klocwork.com/products/insight
• Fortify - http://www8.hp.com/us/en/software-solutions/software-security/
• Flexelint - http://www.gimpel.com/html/flex.htm
• CodeSonar - http://www.grammatech.com/codesonar
• Sonatype - http://www.sonatype.com/
• BlackDuck - https://www.blackducksoftware.com/products/black-duck-hub
• Report - http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/P-5061-software-soar-mobility-Final-Full-Doc-20140716.pdf
• Spreadsheet - http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/P-5061-AppendixE-soar-sw-matrix-v9-mobility.xlsx
Info and Training
• Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) - https://cwe.mitre.org/
• Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) - https://cve.mitre.org/
• Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) - https://capec.mitre.org/
• FedVTE - https://fedvte.usalearning.gov/
• SAFECode - https://training.safecode.org/
• Secure Coding and Standards Tutorial - https://www.safaribooksonline.com/self-registration/nasatutorials/
• Cigitial - https://www.cigital.com/services/training/elearning/
• Pluralsight - https://www.pluralsight.com/search?q=security&categories=course
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Links (cont.)
• Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) Banned Function Calls - https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb288454.aspx
• Stack Overflow Post - http://stackoverflow.com/questions/6747995/a-complete-list-of-unsafe-string-handling-functions-
and-their-safer-replacements
• Flawfinder - http://www.dwheeler.com/flawfinder/
• Cppcheck - http://cppcheck.sourceforge.net/
• Rosecheckers - http://sourceforge.net/projects/rosecheckers/
• Splint - http://www.splint.org
• RATS - https://code.google.com/p/rough-auditing-tool-for-security
• Flawfinder - http://www.dwheeler.com/flawfinder
• SWAMP - https://continuousassurance.org
• Find Bugs - http://findbugs.sourceforge.net/
Mitre Links
• CWE - https://cwe.mitre.org/
• CVE - https://cve.mitre.org/
• CAPEC - https://capec.mitre.org/
Tools
• SOAR Report - http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/P-5061-software-soar-mobility-Final-Full-Doc-20140716.pdf
• Sonatype - http://www.sonatype.com/
• Black Duck HUB - https://www.blackducksoftware.com/products/black-duck-hub
• OWASP Dependency Check - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Dependency_Check
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Links (cont.)
IDA Work
• report - http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/P-5061-software-soar-mobility-Final-Full-Doc-20140716.pdf
• matrix - http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/P-5061-AppendixE-soar-sw-matrix-v9-mobility.xlsx
• NSA’s CAS - http://samate.nist.gov/docs/CAS_2011_SA_Tool_Method.pdf
• Institute for Defense Analyses - http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/P-5061-software-soar-mobility-Final-Full-Doc-20140716.pdf
Standards
• C - https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/c/SEI+CERT+C+Coding+Standard
• C++ - https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=637
• JAVA - https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/java/SEI+CERT+Oracle+Coding+Standard+for+Java
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tools_for_static_code_analysis
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Acronym List
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Acronym List ACL Access Control Lists NIST National Institute for Standards and Technology C2 Command and Control OPM Office of Personal Management CIS Center for Internet Security PIM Privileged Identity Management CND Computer Network Defense SANS  DiD Defense in Depth SIEM Security Incident and Event Manager DLP Data Loss Prevention SPAN Switch Port for Analysis DMZ Demilitarized Zone SSH Secure Shell HW Hardware SSL Secure Sockets Layer IDS Intrusion Detection System SW Software IONet Internet Protocol Operation Network TAP Test Access Point IP Internet Protocol TC Telecommands IPS Intrusion Protection System TM Telemetry IT Information Technology VPN Virtual Private Network MOC Mission Operations Center WSC White Sands Complex NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration    
Low Hanging Fruit
Unsafe Functions
• Stop using known unsafe functions and always do bounds checking 
if you are copying to a buffer
– Even if you think you know what you are copying from and it’s limited, 
defensive coding is best.
• Some samples of unsafe functions due to allowed writing with no 
regard to buffer size
• Most of these are unsafe due to allowed writing with no regard to 
buffer size
– strncpy, _iota, sscanf, & wcslen have safer _s varieties (ex. _iota_s) 
that require a buffer size to be specified
• Resource: Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) Banned Function Calls
• Resource: Stack Overflow Post
• Free tool to help find unsafe functions - Flawfinder
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memset
memcpy 
strcat 
strcmp 
strcpy 
strlen
sprintf
strncpy
_iota
sscanf
wcslen
Low Hanging Fruit
CERT Rules
• For legacy code:
– MSC00-C. Compile cleanly at high warning levels
• The process of fixing compiler warnings will probably 
quash some other vulnerabilities.
– ERR33-C. Detect and handle standard library 
errors
• Include any program functions that give some kind of 
error indication
– If a function returns some special value on error, such as 
NULL, your calls to that function should always check its 
return value
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Low Hanging Fruit
CERT Rules (cont.)
• For new code
– ERR00-C. Adopt and implement a consistent and comprehensive error-handling policy
• This is where programs fail the most easily. They fail to check for errors because the developers 
don't know what to do if an unexpected error occurs.
– MEM00-C. Allocate and free memory in the same module, at the same level of 
abstraction
• A design issue, but not following it will get your code into hot water quickly.
– MEM12-C. Consider using a goto chain when leaving a function on error when using and 
releasing resources
• More specifically, make sure your code frees resources even if errors occur.
• For both new and existing code: execute static code analysis 
tools to determine weaknesses
• Free ones are a good place to start; See slide 14 for commercial ones
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– Cppcheck 
– Rosecheckers
– Splint
– Find Bugs
– RATS
– Flawfinder
– SWAMP
Back
Some Secure Coding Best Practices
1. Validate input. Validate input from all untrusted data sources. Proper input validation can eliminate the 
vast majority of software vulnerabilities. Be suspicious of most external data sources, including 
command line arguments, network interfaces, environmental variables, and user controlled files.
2. Heed compiler warnings. Compile code using the highest warning level available for your compiler and 
eliminate warnings by modifying the code.
3. Use Code Analysis Tools. Use static and dynamic analysis tools to detect and eliminate additional 
security flaws. Dynamic analysis is the testing and evaluation of an application during runtime. Static 
analysis is the testing and evaluation of an application by examining the code without executing the 
application. Many software defects that cause memory and threading errors can be detected both 
dynamically and statically. The two approaches are complementary because no single approach can find 
every error. The primary advantage of dynamic analysis: It reveals subtle defects or vulnerabilities 
whose cause is too complex to be discovered by static analysis. Dynamic analysis can play a role in 
security assurance, but its primary goal is finding and debugging errors. The primary advantage of static 
analysis: It examines all possible execution paths and variable values, not just those invoked during 
execution. Thus static analysis can reveal errors that may not manifest themselves until weeks, months 
or years after release. This aspect of static analysis is especially valuable in security assurance, because 
security attacks often exercise an application in unforeseen and untested ways.
4. Use Binary Analysis Tools. Binary analysis creates a behavioral model by analyzing an application's 
control and data flow through executable machine code – the way an attacker sees it. Unlike source 
code tools, this approach accurately detects issues in the core application and extends coverage to 
vulnerabilities found in 3rd party libraries, pre-packaged components, and code introduced by compiler 
or platform specific interpretations.
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Some Secure Coding Best Practices
5. Architect and design for security policies. Create software architecture and design your software to implement 
and enforce security policies. For example, if your system requires different privileges at different times, 
consider dividing the system into distinct intercommunicating subsystems, each with an appropriate privilege 
set.
6. Keep it simple. Keep the design as simple and small as possible. Complex designs increase the likelihood that 
errors will be made in their implementation, configuration, and use. Additionally, the effort required to achieve 
an appropriate level of assurance increases dramatically as security mechanisms become more complex.
7. Default deny. Base access decisions on permission rather than exclusion. This means that, by default, access is 
denied and the protection scheme identifies conditions under which access is permitted.
8. Adhere to the principle of least privilege. Every process should execute with the least set of privileges 
necessary to complete the job. Any elevated permission should be held for a minimum time. This approach 
reduces the opportunities an attacker has to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges.
9. Sanitize data sent to other systems. Sanitize all data passed to complex subsystems such as command shells, 
relational databases, and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components. Attackers may be able to invoke unused 
functionality in these components through the use of SQL, command, or other injection attacks. This is not 
necessarily an input validation problem because the complex subsystem being invoked does not understand the 
context in which the call is made. Because the calling process understands the context, it is responsible for 
sanitizing the data before invoking the subsystem.
10. Practice defense in depth. Manage risk with multiple defensive strategies, so that if one layer of defense turns 
out to be inadequate, another layer of defense can prevent a security flaw from becoming an exploitable 
vulnerability and/or limit the consequences of a successful exploit. For example, combining secure 
programming techniques with secure runtime environments should reduce the likelihood that vulnerabilities 
remaining in the code at deployment time can be exploited in the operational environment.
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Some Secure Coding Best Practices
11. Use effective quality assurance techniques. Good quality assurance techniques can be effective in 
identifying and eliminating vulnerabilities. Fuzz testing, penetration testing, and source code audits 
should all be incorporated as part of an effective quality assurance program. Independent security 
reviews can lead to more secure systems. External reviewers bring an independent perspective; for 
example, in identifying and correcting invalid assumptions.
12. Adopt a secure coding standard. Develop and/or apply a secure coding standard for your target 
development language and platform.
13. Define security requirements. Identify and document security requirements early in the development 
life cycle and make sure that subsequent development artifacts are evaluated for compliance with those 
requirements. When security requirements are not defined, the security of the resulting system cannot 
be effectively evaluated.
14. Model threats. Use threat modeling to anticipate the threats to which the software will be subjected. 
Threat modeling involves identifying key assets, decomposing the application, identifying and 
categorizing the threats to each asset or component, rating the threats based on a risk ranking, and 
then developing threat mitigation strategies that are implemented in designs, code, and test cases.
15. Don't trust services. Many organizations utilize the processing capabilities of third party partners, who 
more than likely have differing security policies and posture than you. It is unlikely that you can 
influence or control any external third party, whether they are home users or major suppliers or 
partners. Therefore, implicit trust of externally run systems is not warranted. All external systems should 
be treated in a similar fashion.
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Some Secure Coding Best Practices
16. Separation of duties. A key fraud control is separation of duties. For example, someone who requests a 
computer cannot also sign for it, nor should they directly receive the computer. This prevents the user 
from requesting many computers, and claiming they never arrived. Certain roles have different levels of 
trust than normal users. In particular, administrators are different to normal users. In general, 
administrators should not be users of the application.
17. Software Supply Chain. IT managers should create and preserve a bill of materials, or a list of 
ingredients, for the components used in a given piece of software. The complexities and 
interdependencies of the IT ecosystem require software suppliers to not only be able to demonstrate 
the security of products they produce, but also evaluate the integrity of products they acquire and use. 
Ultimately this should lead to greater confidence through integrity checks incorporated in a defined 
secure development lifecycle.
18. Avoid security by obscurity. Security through obscurity is a weak security control, and nearly always 
fails when it is the only control. This is not to say that keeping secrets is a bad idea, it simply means that 
the security of key systems should not be reliant upon keeping details hidden. For example, the security 
of an application should not rely upon knowledge of the source code being kept secret. The security 
should rely upon many other factors, including reasonable password policies, defense in depth, business 
transaction limits, solid network architecture, and fraud and audit controls. A practical example is Linux. 
Linux's source code is widely available, and yet when properly secured, Linux is a hardy, secure and 
robust operating system.
19. Fix security issues correctly. Once a security issue has been identified, it is important to develop a test 
for it, and to understand the root cause of the issue. When design patterns are used, it is likely that the 
security issue is widespread amongst all code bases, so developing the right fix without introducing 
regressions is essential.
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Example Security Analysis (Part 1)
Threats and Vulnerabilities
• Document credible threat environment, identify vulnerabilities
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a
b
2
3
c
1
• Credible threat environment (notional)
• Satellite
• Mission Ops
• Science Ops
• Ground station – Satellite Links
• Mission Ops - Ground Stations
• Science Ops (evaluate all points of 
entry) – Ground Station +
• Three types of threat groups identified
• Communication paths
• Ground elements
• Satellite
• Establish risk using Confidentiality, Integrity 
and Availability
• Assess that communications paths 
and ground elements pose high risk
• Assess that satellite poses low-
moderate risk (assuming other 
system aspects are secure)
1
Satellite Threats 
•Replay
•Unauthorized Access
•Software Threats
•Eavesdropping
•Denial of Service
•Data Modification
Ground Element Threats
• Replay
•Unauthorized Access
•Software Threats/Supply 
Chain
•Denial of Service
•Social Engineering
• Threat-Agent/Insider 
Threat
2
3
a
b
c
Communication Path 
Threats 
•Jamming
• Eavesdropping
• Replay
• Unauthorized Access
• Traffic Analysis
• Data Modification
• Supply Chain
Example Security Analysis (Part 2)
Security Strategy
• Project survivability strategy against credible threats,
vulnerabilities, and acknowledge evolving threat environment
• Strategy defined in terms of interfaces and information types (establish security 
perimeters and how strong they need to be)
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• Security strategy is at element level and at 
system level to arrive at acceptable risk 
posture
• For example, if the Mission Ops and 
command interface into a spacecraft is 
secure, perhaps less security is needed 
within the satellite
• Candidate security strategy for SC FSW
• Protect the commanding path
• Perform command authentication
• Command traffic analysis
• Provide satellite software resiliency to 
common weakness enumerations
Example Security Analysis (Part 3)
Security Controls
• Once threats, perimeters (interfaces and information types established), 
engineering process to select controls and tailor accordingly
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• Establish security categorization
• Select Controls, based on 800-53 analysis, 
system specific tailoring
- Required Controls
- Supplemental Controls
• Consider 
- Data in Motion, Data at Rest, Data in Use
- Strength of the control, pervasiveness of 
threats  
• Hints:
- Sometimes one control addresses 
multiple threats, collateral security
- For spacecraft software, SC and SI are the 
most relevant control families
- Controls may already be addressed through 
design or fault management (e.g., SI-10(3)), e.g. 
applying a robust set of security controls may 
simply require taking credit for what is already 
being done
Satellite Threats 
Communication Path 
Threats 
Candidate SC FSW Threats, Perimeters
Strategy Candidate Security Control SW
Command Path Encryption X
Cmd Authentication Protocol X
Command Traffic Monitoring
Software Resiliency Coding Standards X
Candidate security controls based on planned 
strategy
Governance / Relationships Between Expected 
Artifacts / Decomposition of Security Requirements
Threat Summary
Threat environment that the mission 
is most likely encounter as it reaches 
operational capability
Project Protection Plan 
(PPP)
Mission survivability strategies in 
addressing the threats
Level
3
System Security Plan 
(SSP)
Basis for specific HW and SW security 
requirements  for a given information 
system in the missionLevel
3
System Security Plan 
(SSP)
Basis for specific HW and SW security 
requirements  for a given information 
system in the mission
“System” Security 
Plan(s) (SSP(s))
One or more plans that specify  
and allocate security controls 
across program elements to 
implement the protection 
strategies described in the PPP. 
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), EOs, etc.
Policy and Directives
The number and 
organization  of 
these plans are not 
as important as the 
coverage for the PPP 
strategies, the 
completeness of the 
control selections, 
and traceability to 
software 
requirements (where 
applicable).
NIST 800-53
Catalog of controls 
with a process for 
selecting and 
tailoring the 
controls to meet 
mission / system 
security needs. 
(Provides more of 
the “what to do.”)
Mandatory for 
terrestrial networks 
and IT systems (to 
include ground 
systems)—advisable 
for space systems 
(space system 
“overlay” available).
Software 
Requirements & 
Design
FSW GSW
Software Products 
& COTS 
Customizations
FSW GSW
Project 
Controls 
(Dev.  
Facilities & 
Processes, 
etc.)
Agency / 
Center 
Infrastructure, 
External 
Networks, Intl. 
Partners, etc.
Points of Assurance
Threat Summary
Threat environment that the mission 
is most likely encounter as it reaches 
operational capability
Project Protection Plan 
(PPP)
Mission survivability strategies in 
addressing the threats
Level
3
System Security Plan 
(SSP)
Basis for specific HW and SW security 
requirements  for a given information 
system in the missionLevel
3
System Security Plan 
(SSP)
Basis for specific HW and SW security 
requirements  for a given information 
system in the mission
“System” Security 
Plan(s) (SSP(s))
One or more plans that specify  
and allocate security controls 
across program elements to 
implement the protection 
strategies described in the PPP. 
Software 
Requirements & 
Design
FSW GSW
Software 
Products & COTS 
Customizations
FSW GSW
Project 
Controls 
(Dev.  
Facilities & 
Processes, 
etc.)
Agency / 
Center 
Infrastructure, 
External 
Networks, Intl. 
Partners, etc.
The project has a Threat 
Summary—or the PPP 
contains information—
that indicates the project 
has taken into account 
the full range of threats 
appropriate to its mission 
type, capabilities, and 
assets.
The PPP contains a 
comprehensive set of 
project survivability and 
protection strategies 
addressing the full range of 
threats and vulnerabilities 
that exist or are likely to 
exist throughout its 
lifecycle. Also, it contains 
an assessment of risk 
showing how the strategies 
mitigate the project’s risk 
to an acceptable level.
System-level plans fully 
integrate the 
protection strategies 
from the PPP are 
traceable to control 
selection, allocation 
tailoring decisions at all 
levels of the system 
design along with any 
corresponding system 
specifications. 
Additionally, these 
decisions are based on 
an appropriate 
categorization of the 
specific data and assets 
being protected in each 
instance ensuring risk is 
mitigated to a level 
consistent with the 
project’s risk tolerance 
(as defined in the PPP).
Controls allocated to 
software are traceable down 
to specific software modules 
and completely and correctly 
specify the control
Controls implemented in software perform as specified.
Software products are robust and free from:
• Defects that many induce additional vulnerabilities 
or bypass controls (CWEs)
• Undocumented / unspecified functionality
Plans and specifications 
for programmatic 
controls  such as secure 
development and 
acquisition processes, 
physical and personnel 
security, change control, 
and routine plan 
maintenance are 
complete and consistent 
with PPP project 
protection strategies and 
risk tolerance.
Use of outside systems, 
networks, and controls 
are fully described with 
supplemental controls 
applied as needed to 
mitigate risk.
